Intenzionalità e azione nel mondo delle emozioni. Damasio e i suoi critici: rilevanza filosofica di un dialogo scientifico

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to introduce the debate on some relevant philosophical problems raised by Damasio’s works. I will start with some critiques against Damasio’s approach, such as his falling back into cartesianism or into some form of mentalism, his failing to consider the results of psychiatry and neurodynamics, the «mereological fallacy» of his representationalism. I will discuss other issues such as the interpretation of emotional processes, the problem of separation between feelings and emotions, the marginal role of the sensory-motor system in his „sensory-centric‟ theory of emotions. Then I will focus on the problem of consciousness, the different forms of emergency of the self and the role played by emotions in the constitution of mental representations. I will finally analyze some philosophical aspects of the critical debate on Damasio’s approach and I will briefly hint at the ethical implications raised by the debate.