Trasparenza ed esteriorità. L’Entäusserung dell’idea assoluta come natura

Abstract

The following article deals with one of the most controversial issues in Hegel’s philosophy, namely, the connection between the absolute Idea of his Science of Logic and the beginning of his Naturphilosophie. I would like to show the logical necessity that leads pure thinking to assume the form of externality and to make the notion of externality part of a wider framework concerning Hegel’s thought. For this purpose, I bring the last chapter of Hegel’s Science of Logic into focus. Firstly, I make a distinction between the genetic and the retrospective points of view according to which the Logic should be read, that is, the distinction between the absolute Idea as such and the absolute Idea as method. Secondly, a deeper analysis of the three moments of method brings us to reconsider the relations among the three main parts of Hegel’s logic (being, essence, concept) and the crucial role played by essence in the following development. Then I also distinguish two kinds of reflection of the method. From this account, it becomes clear that pure thought forsakes its purity by discovering a contradiction between its form and its content. I move on explaining why Hegel’s philosophy of nature is first characterized as intuition, quantity and space. In so doing, I hope to show not only the necessity of the Entäußerung of the logical Idea as nature, but also to touch upon the wider meaning of externality and its relevance for Hegel’s view on reason.